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The Greenhouse Effect: 
Damages, Costs and Abatement 
ROBERT U. AYRES" and JORG WALTER b 
Abstract. The buildup of so-called "greenhouse gases" in the atmosphere - -CO2 in par- 
ticular --appears to be having an adverse impact on the global climate. This paper briefly 
reviews current expectations with regard to physical and biological effects, their potential 
costs to society, and likely costs of abatement. For a "worst case" scenario it is impossible to 
assess, in economic terms, the full range of possible non-linear synergistic effects. In the 
'~most favorable" (although not necessarily "likely") case (of slow-paced climate change), 
however, it seems likely that the impacts are within the "affordable" range, at least in the 
industrialized countries of the world. In the "third world" the notion of affordability is of 
doubtful relevance, making the problem of quantitative valuation almost impossible. We 
tentatively assess the lower limit of quantifiable climate-induced damages at $30 to $35 per 
ton of "CO2 equivalent", worldwide, with the major damages being concentrated in regions 
most adversely affected by sea-level rise. The non-quantifiable environmental damages are 
also significant and should by no means be disregarded. 
The costs and benefits of (1) reducing CFC use and (2) reducing fossil fuel consump- 
tion, as a means of abatement, are considered in some detail. This strategy has remarkably 
high mdirect benefits in terms of reduced air pollution damage and even direct cost savings 
to consumers. The indirect benefits of reduced air pollution and its associated health and 
environmental effects from fossil-fuel combustion in the industrialized countries range from 
$20 to $60 per ton of CO 2 eliminated. In addition, there is good evidence that modest (e.g. 
25%) reductions in COz emissions may be achievable by the U.S. (and, by implication, for 
other countries) by a combination of increased energy .efficiency and restructuring that 
would permit simultaneous direct economic benefits (savings) to energy consumers of the 
order of $50 per ton of COz saved. A higher level of overall emissions reduction -- possibly 
approaching 50% -- could probably be achieved, at little or no net cost, by taking advantage 
of these savings. 
We suggest the use of taxes on fossil fuel extraction (or a carbon tax) as a reasonable way 
of inducing the structural changes that would be required to achieve significant reduction in 
energy use and CO 2 emissions. To minimize the economic burden (and create a political 
constituency in support of the approach) we suggest the substitution of resource-based taxes 
in general for other types of taxes (on labor, income, real estate, or trade) that are now the 
main sources of government revenue. While it is conceded that it would be difficult to 
calculate the "optimal" tax on extractive resources, we do not think this is a necessary 
prerequisite to policy-making. In fact, we note that the existing tax system has never been 
optimized according to theoretical principles, and is far from optimal by any reasonable 
criteria. 
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CO2-equivalent; means RIGs, weighted in respect to radiative properties. 
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Radiatively Important Gases also called Greenhouse gases. Denotes CO2, N20, 
CH4, tropospheric ozone and CFC. 
sea level rise 
ton carbon dioxide per year, if used as emission or absorption rate; otherwise 
mentioned. 
1. Introduction 
Human economic and industrial activity has reached a level of intensity 
that threatens the stability of the global-gtmosphere-biosphere system. One 
consequence to be expected is a sigriifilzant warming of the climate. The 
proximate cause is a buildup of the concentrations of several trace gases in 
the atmosphere. The so-called Radiatively Importafit Gases (RIG's) are 
carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N20), and methane (CH4)  , tropo- 
spheric ozone (03), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's). Since pre-industrial 
times the first four gases have increased by 25%, 96%, 8%, and 0--25%, 
respectively (Ramanathan 88). CFC's are purely anthropogenic, having 
been invented in the early 1930's. They are used commercially as refrig- 
erants, solvents and forming agents. 
These greenhouse gases or RIG's are transparent to incoming short-wave 
(visible) radiation but they strongly absorb and reradiate long-wave thermal 
radiation. The net result is to change the radiative balance of the earth in 
such a way that more energy is trapped. 
One of the major uncertainties in the system is ocean uptake. Today, it is 
generally believed that about 50% of anthropogenic CO2 emissions are 
absorbed by the ocean, the remainder accumulating in the atmosphere. The 
accumulation (which is directly measurable, of course), results in other 
effects. One of them is an increased rate of photosynthesis. However, the 
rate of absorption (net of re-emission) by the oceans is still somewhat 
uncertain, and the exact role of the various actors in the system is still open 
to some question. 
CO 2 is an essential input to photosynthesis by green plants. From labo- 
ratory experiments, it is estimated that a doubling of ambient CO: concen- 
tration would cause a 10--50% increase in the yield of so-called C 3 crops 
(e.g. wheat, rice) and a 0--10% increase in yield of C 4 crops (e.g. corn). 
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Depending on specific crop and growing conditions, the amount of water 
required to fix a unit of carbon is reduced, increasing yields in cases of 
growth limited by water availability (Bolin et al. 86). Leaf stomata, where 
gas exchange takes place (CO 2 in, O 2 and water vapor out) tend to 
decrease in size. Whether the effect of CO2 "fertilization" will occur in 
open fields is uncertain. A few ambiguous multiple year experiments 
reported suggest no permanent increase in the photosynthetic rate (Sedjo & 
Solomon 90). The possibility of biochemical surprises cannot be ruled out 
if the concentration of a major component of organic life is doubled. (By 
comparison, the ambient CO2 concentration during the last Ice Age, 18 
thousand years ago, was 25% lower than it is now). 
A consequence of overall climate warming is likely to be changes in the 
temporal and spatial distribution of temperature, precipitation, evapo-tran- 
spiration, clouds and air currents. All of these are simulated in so-called 
global circulation models (GCM's), although the detailed results of the 
simulations are not as yet a trustworthy basis for forecasting. (The next 
generation of such models should be considerably improved). Computa- 
tions carried out to date, comparing equilibrium for the 2 X CO2 condition 
with control runs for current climate, show very non-uniform response 
even to uniform change in RIGs. In effect, the regional effects are much 
more variable - -and  uncertain - - than the global average projections. 1 
However, the non-linear character of the system makes it likely that better 
GCM's will continue to exhibit significant regional variability. 
The global mean temperature (GMT) is expected to rise between 2 ~ 
and 5 ~ for the 2 x CO2 condition (Schneider & Rosenberg 90). This is 
remarkable compared to the last Ice Age extreme: 18 thousand years ago 
GMT was about 5 ~ colder than today (Schneider 89). The regional 
averages change from -3  to +10 ~ with probable changes in seasonality 
and variability. 
Global precipitation is likely to increase by 7--10% (high confidence); 
regional changes are projected to range from -20% to +20% (low con- 
fidence). The largest warming will occur in high latitudes, and will be 
combined with large precipitation i creases in winter. Higher temperatures 
will probably (high confidence) increase vapo-transpiration by 5--10% on 
global average (Schneider & Rosenberg 90). Soil moisture is controlled 
by precipitation, evapo-transpiration a d run-off. Regional changes are 
projected (medium confidence) to be in the range of plus or minus 50% 
(ibid.). 
Run-off would increase globally. Changes on a regional scale of -50% to 
+50% are expected (ibid.). They are direct results of changes in evapo- 
transpiration (which is strongly influenced by temperature) and precipita- 
tion. Simulation studies on arid and semiarid river basins in the USA 
suggest hat relatively small changes in temperature and precipitation can 
have multiplier effects on run-off. There is evidence that run-off will 
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increase in winter in high latitudes, and decrease in summer in mid and low 
latitudes. These changes in run-off patterns "could greatly alter the likeli- 
hood of flooding and the availability of water during peak-demand periods 
such as irrigation seasons" (Frederick & Gleick 90, p. 133). 
Thermal expansion of the ocean water will be the major cause of the 
expected sea level rise (SLR) in the short term. Robin has estimated the 
SLR to be in the range of 0.2 to 1.65 meters (Robin 86). Warming of the 
ocean is a delayed non-uniform process depending on local mixing rates. 
The feedback to climate will cause a transient phase which is so far not 
predictable with the current (equilibrium) GCM's. Impacts on ocean 
currents like a displacement of the Gulf Stream, or local SLR effects, are 
not taken account of by GCM's available to date. The major uncertainties 
of the current GCM's arise from inadequate knowledge of the air-ocean 
interface and the influence of cloud feedback. (For detailed iscussion of 
uncertainties and model validation, see Schneider & Rosenberg 89). 
2. Damages: Summary 
The effects of climatic change will 'be superimposed on other changes, 
including a general increase in the intensity of land use, forest clearing, 
ground water withdrawal, soil erosion and air and water pollution. Acidity, 
of course, is a consequence of the emission of SO x and NO~ due to fossil 
fuel combustion. Thus acidity and CO 2 "enrichment" of the atmosphere 
tend to increase together. Moreover, the environmental stresses due to 
acidity will tend to have a multiplier effect on the stresses of climate 
change. The combination will further weaken the ability of some species to 
survive. (The environmental cidification problem is already severe in 
some regions; it has been blamed for the drastic "dieback" of conifer 
forests in central and east-central Europe). The combination of climate 
change with other stresses on ecosystems could be more dangerous than 
any one of them taken by itself. 
Impacts of sea level rise (SLR) to coastal regions are potentially massive. 
Coastlines will move inland up to several hundred meters, in many places, 
depending on beach slope and characteristics of the beach material 
(Hekstra 90). Salt water will also move upstream via rivers into lowland, 
freshwater pockets behind coastal dunes, and into ground water aquifers. 
The effect will be magnified in some areas where intensive ground water 
withdrawal has occurred (e.g. Long Island). 
SLR will cause enormous loss of biologically diverse coastal owlands 
and wetland ecosystems (Wilson 89). For instance, Indonesia possesses 
15% of all world coastline and it is the world richest country in terms of 
wetland ecosystems quantity and diversity. Yet "at least 40% of its land 
surface is vulnerable to SLR of 1 m" (ibid., p. 58). Worldwide, the land 
area that would be subject o inundation or made vulnerable by salt water 
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intrusion is about 500 million hectares. This is only about 3% of all land 
area, but it constitutes over 30% of the most productive cropland area 
(ibid., p. 60). As many as one billion people now live in the vulnerable 
areas, including some very large cities. Thus, as has been pointed out, as 
much as one-fifth of world market valued assets could be adversely affected 
(Crosson 90). 
Many environmentalists distrust economic analysis and judge the genera- 
tion of quasi-market prices as ill-suited for the study of economic impacts 
of global climate change, for instance. They tend to advocate notions such 
as "safe minimum standard" as a risk-averse, conservative criterion for the 
survival of species, habitats and ecosystems, provided the costs are not 
"unacceptable large" (e.g., Batie & Shugard 90, p. 129). Yet, these "simple" 
policy instruments are often ineffective in practice, and they may even 
increase costs excessively in relation to benefits achieved. 
In short, there is no real substitute for economic analysis, however 
unsatisfactory the present state of the subject. Nor do we distinguish (as 
some environmentalists do) between economic costs and "other" costs 
(such as eco-degradation), with the implication that the latter cannot be 
compared with (or traded off against) the former. To us, it is a question of 
defining the realm of economics broadly enough. All costs are economic if 
the economy is properly defined, but not all economic osts are automati- 
cally reflected in the marketplace (i.e. "market valued"). Nor are non- 
market-priced environmental ssets (such as parks or ecosystems) included 
in the standard System of National Accounts (SNA). 
3. Nordhaus' Estimates of Damage Costs 
A recent study by William Nordhaus has attempted to estimate the eco- 
nomic costs of climate change (Nordhaus 89, 90). He began with a break- 
down of the U.S. gross national income or GNI 2 (for 1981) by sector and 
subdivided it further into "regimes" of sensitivity. The most climate sensi- 
tive sectors were agriculture, forestry and fisheries, which amounted to 
3.1% of total NI. Moderate sensitivity was attributed to sectors such as 
construction, water transport, utilities etc. These contributed 10.1% of the 
total. The rest (86%) comes from sectors affected negligibly by climate (e.g., 
mining, finance, manufacturing etc.) 
The results of this analysis were as follows: 
1. Agriculture damage costs (offset by the CO 2 fertilization effect) are 
estimated as plus or minus $10 billion as an overall impact on all 
crops. 
2. Sea level rise (SLR) damages were estimated for land loss (15,540 
square kin) and protection of high value property and open coasts by 
levees and dikes. The total market value of the property at risk is on 
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the order of $100 billion. Nordhaus converted this to an estimated 
annual equivalent loss of $6.18 billion per year. (The capital value of 
property should reflect its continuing flow of benefits, thus reflecting 
tourism losses implicitly, at least so far as providers --hotel  and 
motel operators and so on --are concerned. What is omitted is the 
loss of use and option value to users, who may not be able to find 
equivalent amenities elsewhere). 
Greenhouse warming is expected to increase aggregate demand for 
air-conditioning ($1.65 billion/yr) and reduce the demand for space 
heating ($1.16 billion/yr). Assuming average current prices for elec- 
tricity and fuel, there would be a net annual extra cost to the 
economy of S0.46 billion (USEPA 88). 
No specific estimates were made by Nordhaus for other goods or 
services (either market-valued or otherwise). In effect, these were 
lumped together and included in the uncertainty of the overall 
estimate (see below). 
Summarizing tt~e quantified cost items above, the breakdown is as follows: 
8% attributable toenergy demand changes 
92% attributable to SLR (of which 85% is for coastal protection 
cost -- levees, seawalls, etc, -- and 7% is .for loss of low-lying 
land) 
The "bottom line" -- the central (most likely) estimate of total annual 
economic damages - -was  $6.67 billion (1981 dollars), assuming the 
damages occurred in 1981. This,is equal to 0.28% of U.S. gross national 
income for that year. The error bounds were judged (by Nordhaus) to be 
quite a bit higher, due to the omitted unquantified items, but still less than 
2 percent of national income. 
Gross world income (GWI) in the year 2050 is likely to be more than 
$26 trillion 1981 dollars (USEPA 89, low GNP-case). This is 8.1 times 
more than U.S. national income in 1981. Thus Nordhaus judged this 
scaling factor of 8.1 to be appropriate to extrapolate the US damage 
"snapshot" to global annual damages in 2050 (assuming similarity of 
income structures). In other words, annual world damages due to green- 
house warming are "most likely" to be about $54 billion ($1981), with an 
upper limit of $520 billion. Based on expected emissions of 16.9 billion 
tons of CO 2 equivalents Nordhaus converted this to marginal shadow 
damages of emission, viz: 
central case: S3.3/ton (CO2-equiv.) 
worst case: S36.9/ton (CO2-equiv.) 
The above calculation (Nordhaus' numbers) is based on one fairly 
"heroic" (and technically incorrect) assumption with regard to physical 
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damage: that future damage is simply proportional to RIG emission rates 
on a current  basis, i.e., no accumulation of RIGs, and no damage depen- 
dence on rates of warming. Of course, the economic assumptions are 
equally strong, as already noted. For example, the pattern of energy use in 
the U.S. bears little relation to the rest of the world. The extrapolation to 
global scale assumes a similar balance between air-conditioning and space 
heating, which is somewhat implausible. 
4. Modifications to Nordhaus' Estimate 
Bearing in mind the long list of potential adverse ffects and costs, most of 
which have not been quantified - -or even mentioned --by Nordhaus, many 
environmentalists will not be satisfied with the relatively simplistic sort of 
calculation exemplified above. To address these doubts it seems useful to 
examine Nordhaus' assumptions in more detail. We focus, first, on the 
implications of sea level rise (SLR), inagmuch as this item accounts for 
92% of the total costs identified by Nordhat[s. 
With regard to SLR the major costs identified above are protection costs 
of valuable coastal and and beaches (via seawalls, dikes, and levees). The 
total U.S. coast length is about 20,000 kin. Average protection costs of 
about S5 million per km coastline appears reasonable in view of Dutch 
experience ( .g., Hekstra 90). 
The coastline of the world amounts to between 0.5 million and 1 million 
kin. To protect it to the same extent as projected in the US, the total cost 
would be about S2.5-$5 trillion, or 10--20% of minimum GWI for 2050. 
Spread in proportion to GWI over 50 years, as Nordhaus did, this comes 
to about 0.2--0.4% of world GWI annually, or roughly what Nordhaus 
assumed. It is a rough magnitude of avoidance costs for physical protection 
of "protectable" low lying areas, estuaries and so on. 
Nordhaus' estimate of land-loss cost of 1.55 Mha (million hectares) 
along the U.S. coastline (19,924 kin) is equivalent to 77 ha/kin coastline. 
This is a factor of ten less than Hekstra's estimate of 500 Mha vulnerable 
land along 0.5--1.0 million km coastline, or 500--1000 ha/kin (Hekstra 
90). The land value assumed by Nordhaus ($5000/ha) lies in between 
Hekstra's estimate for arable cropland in Bangladesh (S3000/ha) and in 
the Netherlands ($30,000/ha). Assuming Nordhaus' price of $5000/ha the 
total land value loss based on Hekstra's estimate of vulnerability, would be 
S2.5 trillion. Spread over 50 years this would account for 0.3% of the world 
GWI, on average. This is still well within Nordhaus' range of error, of 
course. 
Yet the methodology of estimating potential oss by attaching current 
values to submerged land is inherently suspect, even allowing for "scaling". 
In the first place, current monetary prices of land in different countries 
clearly reflect current levels of money income and exchange rates. In the 
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second place, since the total amount of arable land will be reduced in 
absolute terms, it is clear that the price of the remaining land will rise along 
with the sea level. The gain in land values elsewhere could well outweigh 
the coastal osses. Yet one could hardly conclude that SLR might therefore 
be beneficial. Moreover, the remaining land would have to be cultivated 
more intensively to make up the shortfall, and food prices will rise, as 
Schelling noted. A gain for the (remaining) farmers, but a loss for con- 
sumers. (The same valuation problem arises if OPEC succeeds in raising 
the price of oil). 
The use of land prices (based on current exchange rates) implies that 
coastal and in the U.S. or the Netherlands is more valuable than coastal 
land in Bangladesh or the Nile Delta. This conclusion makes no sense for a 
study of this kind..Land is more productive in Bangladesh or the Nile Delta 
than in the U.S."and probably 'no less productive than in the Nether- 
lands. Land value should be related to its productivity in real terms for 
purposes of assessing long term costs of climate warming. On this basis, 
land losses in Bangladesh or Egypt should be evaluated at S30,000/ha, 
rather than S3000/ha. Using prices based on international exchange rates 
undervalues land in poor countries by an order of magnitude. Moreover (as 
Nordhaus noted) the U.S. derives little of its national income from coastal 
lands; the opposite is true in Bangladesh. A loss of 10% of the arable land 
of a country where 70% of the population lives on the land would 
(roughly) cut its real national income by at least 7%. It is the exchange rate 
that is artificial and misleading (being based on trade balances in a few 
portable commodities and manufactured goods). If the notion of marginal 
utility --rather than land price - -were invoked, it would seem to follow 
that the utility loss to Bangladesh must be far greater, per capita, than the 
utility loss to the U.S. Thus, the extrapolation from U.S. calculations to the 
third world is unsatisfactory, to say the least. 
Since the vulnerable low-lying lands are heavily populated, we must 
expect some environmental refugees. For example, more than 1000 islands 
in the Maldive Atolls may be swallowed up by the sea. The deltas of the 
Brahmaputra River (Bangladesh) and the Nile River (Egypt) are densely 
populated. Assuming SLR of 0.79 m by the year 2050 and 2.17 m. by 
2100, the homes and livelihoods of 46 million self-supporting people 
would be lost (Jacobson 89). Under "really worst case" assumptions, 
including widespread subsidence due to excessive groundwater pumping, 
the number threatened would be substantially higher. Bearing in mind 
Hekstra's estimate of one billion people potentially "affected" by SLR, it is 
not unreasonable to suppose that as many as 100 million people --mainly 
subsistence farmers with no urban experience or skills --may be displaced. 
They will have no place to go except o the already overcrowded cities. 
How much does a refugee cost? It depends where the refugees are 
located and on their status and skills. Malawi's social cost per Mozam- 
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biquan refugee is reported as a mere $24 per capita (The Economist, 
February 18, 1989). An inquiry by the UN High Commissioner of Refu- 
gees and the World Food Program sets the annual average xpenditure of 
these two official institutions per assisted refugee at $72 per capita, or 
about 20 cents per day; not too much. These costs reflect extremely bad 
conditions, such as those in camps for Palestinian refugees located in 
Lebanon and Jordan. On the other hand, the U.S. spends some $4000 per 
accepted refugee ($362 million for 94,000 refugees arriving in 1988 (The 
Economist, September 24, 1988)). 
These are just maintenance or resettlement costs. Since a refugee is 
obviously unproductive for some time, it would be sensible to assume one 
or more years of lost output (GNP/capita). In the case of the "low cost" 
Palestinian re~gees, there is no resettlement program and the production 
loss is much more than a year or two --more nearly permanent. The social 
costs of repression, terrorism, regional political turmoil, and military/police 
responses to all of the above should be included also. These costs tend to 
dwarf the pure "subsistence" costs, although they are almost never properly 
allocated. Even in the case of refugees admitted to the U.S. or other 
industrialized countries, the period of adjustment is significant, especially if
the refugees are uneducated. In order to get a crude magnitude of likely 
social costs for resettling economic refugees from the poorer countries 
(within the same country) we assume a .modest wo year period of lost 
output at S250/yr, or S500/capita t 1981 income levels. (Comparable 
GNP/capita figures for 1985 were: India $270, Bangladesh $160, Egypt 
$760 (WRI 89, p. 236). Altogether, this adds up to $250 billion, over 50 
years. Assuming significant economic growth in these areas, resettlement 
costs and losses rise in proportion; it would not be unreasonable to double 
or even quadruple this figure. To be conservative, we doubt it. 
A revised set of SLR costs, based on the above reasoning, is as follows: 
Coastal protection cost: $2.5-5 trillion 
Coastal and loss: $15 trillion 
Costs of resettling 100 million refugees @ S1000 each: $1.0 
trillion 
Total: S 18.5-21 trillion. 
Of course, this is a total for the world as a whole, spread over 50 years, 
as Nordhaus did, and therefore comparable to his numbers. Annualized, it 
comes to around 2.1--2.4% gross world income (GWI), or nearly 10 times 
higher than Nordhaus "central" estimate for total costs, and slightly outside 
his range of error. For purposes of analysis, therefore, we think $30-35 per 
tonne of CO 2 (equivalent) is more realistic than $3.30, just to take account 
of the effects of SLR on countries like Egypt and Bangladesh. 
To be sure, many indirect effects are still omitted, which have com- 
pletely unknown shadow costs. One of the most obvious is the implicit 
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assumption that there is empty land available somewhere to resettle the 
refugees. In fact, there is no likelihood of such resettlement. Displaced 
persons will crowd into cities creating squatter settlements that tax the 
available city services to the limit. These shanty towns are already prime 
reservoirs of frustration and disaffection, and a breeding ground for 
violence, crime and civil unrest. What are the true social costs of uprooting 
people, taking into account the breakdown of traditions and family rela- 
tions, and the resulting social problems for the rest of society? We do not 
know, except hat the costs are not zero. 
Moreover, large numbers of refugees in Southeast Asia would augment 
the immigration pressure to the more highly developed countries in a 
dramatic way. The "boat people" from Viet Nam may be only the vanguard 
of an enormous migratory wave the world in general (and Australia, in 
particular) is ill-prepared to cope with. So far,. the USA hasn't succeeded in
integrating its black population, after 125 years of struggle. Britain hasn't 
solved its problem with the commonwealth .immigrants, France has diffi- 
culties with the North African immigrants, while West Germany is finding 
its small Turkish minority quite indigestible. Lacking adequate "social 
technologies" most countries will end up spending more money, instead, on 
internal and external security. 
In summary, there is good reason to believe that "when the winners and 
losers have been identified, there will be little interest, on the part of the 
winners to alter their status in order to compensate the losers" (Glantz 88, 
p. 409). In short, there is increasing risk of tensions, frictions and conflicts 
threatening to political stability? Yet, it is impossible to put a convincing 
number on these indirect effects, if 0nly because the causes of social 
tensions and disruptions are multifarious and the "greenhouse ffect" 
contribution is likely to be relatively minor compared to other factors. All 
things considered, Nordhaus' estimates eem too optimistic by a consider- 
able margin. 
Before moving on to consider abatement s rategies and costs, it must be 
pointed out once again that Nordhaus' estimates of losses and costs exclude 
all losses to final users of environmental assets, as well as option and 
bequest value losses. What is the option value of the last Redwood forest or 
the large shade trees on urban streets and in urban parks? Old, slow- 
growing trees like oaks, elms, maples and beeches are clearly vulnerable to 
climate change (cf. the work of Leemans and Solomon, cited earlier) and 
are highly valued. Since fully grown trees cannot be moved, there is no 
actual market for them; however, the retail prices of relatively oung trees 
(around 20 years old) range up to $500. It is quite normal for suburban 
property owners in the U.S. to spend several hundred dollars per year for 
tree care. 
If this can be taken as an indicator of the value of the underlying assets, 
then one would have to impute a value of at least several thousand ollars 
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to each mature shade tree in a built up area. The number of such trees is 
unknown, but it probably exceeds the number of people (at least in the U.S. 
and Western Europe), If the life expectancy of shade trees is reduced from 
200 years to 50 years by rapid climate change, there will be a major loss of 
amenity value, and a sharp increase in expenditure on landscaping (the rate 
of tree-planting would have to increase by 4-fold, for instance). Other costs 
of maintaining parks and gardens will also rise sharply. This would trans- 
late into significant annual costs for both individual homeowners and cities. 
We don't attempt o take the calculation further, except o note that annual 
expenditures by suburban homeowners of the order of 2% or 3% of income 
to maintain trees and shrubs are by no means uncommon today. (Averages 
are smaller, of course). Still, an annual average xpenditure for this purpose 
in the next half century (including indirect outlays) attributable to the 
higher costs of compensating for effects of climate change, would not be 
implausible. 
In summary, we suspect that the sum total of potential losses of this type 
greatly exceeds the items that Nordhaus has actually quantified. 
5. Optimal Abatement 
The usual hypothetical relationship between emissions damages and abate- 
ment costs (Figure 1). Assume we know all damages D(z) as a function of 
annual emission z of greenhouse gases, incorporating present and future 
values, priced and unpriced (see discussion above). Further, assume we 
know the cost function of abatement A(z) for all levels of emissions. By 
assumption A(z) describes the total cost to an economy to abate the next 
8 
o 
D(z) / ( z )  
. . . .  , - - -7  
2,=0 Emission reduction 
Fig. 1. Optimal abatement in economic equilibrium. 
248 Robert U. A yres and Jorg Walter 
increment of greenhouse missions by the most cost-effective available 
means. If reducing fossil fuel combustion is the chosen strategy, then the 
cost curve would reflect the costs of introducing energy-conserving tech- 
nologies or providing alternative fuels, for instance. 
The shape of A(z) is usually derived from two general axioms in 
economic theory, namely, (i) that the economy is always in or (nearly in) 
an equilibrium state and (ii) declining marginal cost-effectiveness of abate- 
ment with increasing levels of abatement. Given these assumptions, abate- 
ment costs are zero at the "Laissez-faire" point (of uncontrolled emissions) 
and increase as a function of increasing abatement (COz-equivalent reduc- 
tion). Because of declining marginal cost-effectiveness, the real cost of 
abatement A (z) can be expected to increase at an increasing rate, as shown. 
The optimal evel of abatement is the minimum of the sum D(z) +A(z), 
which has, by definition, a slope of zero. Both less and more reduction 
would lead to reduced welfare benefit. In other words: the optimal point is 
characterized by equality of the absolute first derivatives (marginal costs) of 
A and D. Evidently, the marginal benefit of abatement is obtained from the 
slope of the damage cost curye, D(z). The marginal cost of abatement is
the slope of A(z), where z is measured in percentage of CO2-equivalent 
reduction. 
Figure 2 contrasts with the usual version (Figure 1) with a rather 
different form of the abatement cost curve. It is inconsistent with one of the 
two key assumptions underlying Figure 1 (the equilibrium assumption), but 
we think it comes much closer to reflecting reality. It reflects the view that, 
D(z) 
J J  
: 
I / M --- D(z) 
J . -~  I '~ Z 
~"~)% Optimal _ . . 
~ -  " ~  abatement level ~mlssxon 
25% reduction 
Fig. 2. Opt ima l  abatement  i  economic  d isequi l ibr ium.  
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in fact, there exists a considerable opportunity to enjoy negative abatement 
costs (i.e. profits) by investing in selected technological "fixes", largely in 
the area of energy conservation. 
The implication, of course, is that, for a variety of reasons --including 
massive market failures --the economy has become "locked in" to a sub- 
optimal state of excessive nergy/resource d pendence. 4 We defend this 
proposition in more detail below. Of course, the optimum degree of abate- 
ment is still the point where D(z) + A(z) is minimal. However, it will be 
noted that the optimal point is significantly to the right of the correspond- 
ing point in the case where A (z) is monotonically increasing (Figure 1) and 
- -more  important --the optimal abatement level is far greater. 
In the following discussion we focus mainly on the costs and benefits of 
CO2 emission reduction by energy conservation and (to the extent feasible) 
fuel substitution. Nordhaus also considered two other possibilities: refores- 
tation and CFC reduction. We review the latter two options briefly in 
Appendices A and B respectively. 
6. Costs of Combustion-Related Emission Reduction 
Ranking various alternative sources of energy and possibilities for switching 
to less carbon rich fuels in terms of cost-effectiveness enables one to 
construct an abatement cost curve such as A(Z) in Figures 5 or 6. 
Assuming the energy supply/conversion a d industrial component of the 
economy "optimizes" quickly to adjust to changing prices (hence, it is 
always in or near its instantaneous equilibrium) such models can be used to 
estimate cost curves for various policy assumptions. Nordhaus has, for 
example, estimated the costs of achieving a given energy output with 
successively lower amounts of CO2 production (Nordhaus 73, 75). He 
found that shadow costs could be expressed by a quadratic function of 
percentage mission reduction. A similar result was later obtained econo- 
metrically (Nordhaus & Yohe 83). Nordhaus used this function (updated to 
1989 prices) in his recent work (Nordhaus 89, 90). 
Another instance of this 'macro' approach is found in the work of 
Manne, Richels and Weyant. 5 This is a major modelling effort linking a 
macro-economic model and an energy supply-conversion optimizatio'n 
model of the "activity" type. There are three underlying assumptions: (1) 
that the economy is always in a quasi-equilibrium state, (2) that it "finds" 
the optimum supply mix for a given demand more or less instantaneously, 
and (3) that energy consumption is both an input (factor) and a cost of 
production and a claim on resources. The former assumption means that 
energy appears as an input in a production function. When the production 
function is econometrically fitted to past data on energy consumption, 
energy prices, and total output of goods and services, it is possible to 
estimate the reduction in output. This can be interpreted (somewhat 
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loosely) as the economic "cost" of reducing energy inputs by a given 
amount. 
The interpretation of 'lost gross output' as 'cost of change' is justified, for 
most economists, by the notion that GNP is a measure of aggregate social 
welfare. This interpretation has been criticized, for various reasons. How- 
ever, we do not propose to review the arguments pro and con further here. 
Engineers and businessmen think of costs in a somewhat different and 
more traditional way. A businessman would try to compute cost as the 
annualized net additional capital and operating costs of investing in and 
using a new technology. It can happen, of course, that little or no new 
investment is needed or that the result of the substitution results in a net 
saving, rather than a net cost. 
For a business or a householder, a "net saving" translates into a profit, 
or a return on investment. The usual standard of comparison is money 
invested in high quality government bonds, or, simply "money in the bank". 
In other words, if a given investment produces a greater eturn (assuming 
equal risk) than money invested at the current rate of interest, it is "profit- 
able" in the above sense. If the rate of return is less than the interest rate, 
the investment is a loser. The usual target rate of return-on-investment 
(ROI) for business investments --which tend to be fairly risky, and which 
must allow for taxes on the profits -- is typically around 30% per annum. If 
the best return that can be realistically expected is only 15%, a prudent 
businessman will not make the investment. On the other hand, for a 
government (which does not have to pay taxes and can borrow money at 
lower rates than a private business)~; an 8% or .10% expected rate of return 
is probably adequate justification.61'(This is often equated roughly with the 
social discount rate). 
Given that capital is scarce, it is rational to invest in the most profitable 
ventures first. Thus, a business will typically try to rank order the various 
proposals for capital spending (in order of expected ROI) and go down the 
list until either the available money for investment runs out or the thres- 
hold is reached. In principle, government would do the same. In a quasi- 
equilibrium economy, there should be enough capital to fund all of the 
promising projects, i.e. all the projects with expected RO! above the appro- 
priate threshold level. It follows that the really "good" (i.e. profitable) 
projects should be funded as soon as they appear on the horizon. In an 
economy very close to instantaneous equilibrium there should be very few 
investment opportunities capable of yielding returns far above the average. 
(In fact, the average return after taxes should be the same as the rate of 
GNP growth). The existence of many opportunities is an indication of 
significant deviation from instantaneous equilibrium. 
In this context, it is relevant o note that most large-scale nergy supply 
projects (e.g. hydroelectric or steam-electric plants) yield a long-term real 
net rate of return between 5% and 10% (Economist, January 6 1990, p. 
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59). Since this is below the threshold level for a rational tax-paying profit 
maximizer, it is difficult not to suspect that non-economic factors are 
involved in diverting capital into such investments. 
On the other hand, there is ample evidence of under-utilization of 
profitable opportunities for conserving energy. In a major study carried out 
by the Italian energy research institute ENEA it was shown that techno- 
logical "fixes" exist with payback times of 1--3 years - -wel l  below the 
typical threshold for most firms and several times faster than investments in
new supplies (e.g., d'Errico et al. 84). 
Even more convincing evidence comes from the experience of the 
Louisiana Division of Dow Chemical Co. in the U.S. In 1981 an "energy 
contest" was initiated, with a simple objective: to identify capital projects 
costing less than $200,000 with payback times of less than 1 year (Nelson 
89). In its first full year (1982), 38 projects were submitted, of which 27 
were selected for funding. Total investment was $1.7 million and the 27 
projects yielded an average ROI of 173%. (That is, the payback time was 
only about 7 months). Since 1982, the contest has continued, with an 
increased number of projects funded each year. The ROI cutoff was 
reduced year-by-year to 30% in 1987, and the maximum capital investment 
was gradually increased. Nevertheless, in the year 1988 95 projects were 
funded, for a total capital outlay of $21.9 million and -- surprisingly -- an 
average ROI of 190%! The average submitted ROI for 167 audited projects 
over the entire 7 years was 189%, while the actual (post-audit) average was 
198%. Table I summarizes the results of the Dow experience. 
It is important o note that, although the number of funded projects 
increased each year, there is (through 1988) no evidence of saturation. 
Numerous profitable opportunities for saving energy, with payback times 
well below one year, apparently still exist at Dow even after the program 
has been in existence for 7 years. One would have to suspect hat the 
program could still be expanded many-fold before reaching the 30% ROI 
threshold. Furthermore, it is important o emphasize that these oppor- 
tunities exist even at relatively low U.S. energy prices. Should taxes or a 
new energy crisis force U.S. prices higher (i.e. toward world levels), the 
number of such opportunities would be multiplied further. 
At the macro-level, it has been argued by the Mellon Institute that a 
"least cost" strategy for providing energy services for the U.S. in 1978 
would have utilized much less primary energy, and in a very different 
manner, than that which was actually observed (Sant 79). In economic 
terms, the least-cost strategy would have saved $800 per family (17%) or 
$43 billion in that year alone (ibid.). Taking the year 1973 as a standard for 
comparison, such a strategy would have involved a sharp reduction in the 
use of centrally generated electricity (from 30% to 17%) and a reduction in 
petroleum use from 36% to 26%. The only primary fuel to increase its 
share would have been natural gas (from 17% to 19%). Interestingly, the 
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The primary fuel equivalent of service demand in 1978 was 79.0 quads, plus 9.2 quads of 
improved efficiency (calculated against a base of stock & equipment in place in 1973) or a 
total of 88.2 quads. Actual service depends on the conversion efficiency of fuels & equipment 
utilized. 
1 quad = a quadrillion = 10"'15 BTU. Another means of visualizing a quad is 1 milhon 
barrels/day of oil equivalent = 10'* 15 BTU (quads)/year. 
b In terms of primary fuel. c Primary fuels demand in 1973 was 74.6 quads. 
Fig. 3. Energy sector market shares aof various technologies. Source: (Sant 79). 
Table I. Summary of Louisiana division contest results --all projects 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Winning Projects 27 32 38 59 60 92 95 
Capital, SMM 1.7 2.2 4.0 7.1 7.1 21.8 21.9 
Average ROI (%) 173 340 208 124 106 77 190 
ROI Cut-Off (%) 100 100 100 50 40 30 30 
Savings, SM/yr 
Fuel Gas a 83 -63  1506 2498 798 2550 10790 
Capacity 1197 2578 
Maintenance 10 45 -59  187 357 2206 583 
Miscellaneous 19 -98  
Total Savings 1590 3838 5341 7353 6894 11944 18023 
All fuel gas savings are based on 1988 incremental fuel gas value. 
Source: (Nelson 89), Table 1. 
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The primary fuel equivalent of service demand in 1978 was 28.2 quads, plus 7.9 quads of 
improved efficiency & 0.8 quads of biomass (calculated against a base of stock & equipment 
in place in 1973) or a total of 88.2 quads. 
b In terms of primary fuel. 
Fig. 4. Industry energy service market shares aof various technologies. Source: (Sant 79). 
Mellon study suggested that "conservation services" would have increased 
their share from 10% to 32% in the optimal case. See Figures 3 and 4. 
What the Mellon study showed, in fact, is that (at 1978 energy prices) 
conservation, up to a point, would not have cost more  (as Figure 1 implies) 
- - i t  would have cost less (as in Figure 2). 7 Between 1973 and 1978 
"conservation services" reduced actual energy consumption by 10% com- 
pared to the 1973 baseline pattern; but a 32% reduction would have been 
not only possible, but cheaper! The differential between actual and poten- 
tial is 22%. The greatest potential savings were to be found in the so called 
"buildings" sector (23%), but non-trivial savings (10%) were also available 
in the industrial sector. Significant opportunities also existed in industry, 
notably by avoiding (or in other words, using) waste heat by means of heat- 
cascading, heat pumps and co-generation (of electricity and process heat). 
Assuming the Mellon Institute's figures to be roughly correct, the 22% 
unachieved but possible energy savings in 1978 would have reduced 
carbon dioxide production by at least 25% as compared to actual emis- 
sions. This amounted to around 275 million tons. The monetary savings to 
energy consumers would have been $43 billion, as noted, or about $65 per 
ton of CO2 saved. This point would define the low point of the (negative) 
marginal cost of abatement curve in Figure 2. 
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If the curve in Figure 2 is symmetric on both sides of this point, it 
follows that a gross reduction in fossil energy use and CO 2 emissions of 
roughly 50% should have been achievable (in 1978) at zero net cost to the 
economy as compared with the actuality. Clearly the optimum abatement 
level would be somewhat further to the right, perhaps around the 60% 
level, depending on the value of reducing emissions. 
Admittedly the 1978 disequilibrium ight have been reduced somewhat 
in the last decade, and energy prices have (temporarily) dropped. The 
above calculation is illustrative, at best. Still, an increase in energy prices 
(via taxes) would merely increase the already clear benefits of investing in 
energy conservation. Others have arrived at similar conclusions (see, for 
example, Lovins et al. 81). There is growing evidence supported by numer- 
ous examples that many investments in energy conservation can pay for 
themselves in reduced operating costs in a few months to a few years, even 
at present (lower) energy prices. 
Before moving on to other issues, it is worthwhile commenting on the 
evident discrepancy between actual behavior and optimal behavior. Con- 
sumer behavior with regard to energy conservation is sometimes dismissed 
as "stupidity-limited" (Schipper 89). However, what appears to be "stu- 
pidity" at first glance can be resolved into .two other phenomena. One of 
the probable xplanatory factors is inadequate information. (Information is 
not costless, in the real world). It has been remarked that lack of awareness 
by the consumer is a major impediment to increasing conservation i  the 
end-use sector. Consumers focus today mainly on product color, size, and 
features and only a small amount on energy consumption during the 
appliance's lifetime. To some extent his can be countered by public infor- 
mation and awareness campaigns and government-sponsored information 
programs, such as "green labelling". 
The other phenomenon, which deserves more study, is that individuals 
seem to display extremely high discount rates in their personal financial 
affairs. To put it simply, people will not voluntarily pay much extra or 
wait very long for promised savings in future operating costs of houses, 
automobiles or appliances. One study, based on detailed survey data on 
household appliance purchases, has inferred the average discount rate for 
consumers to be 20% (Hausman 79). It is strongly income dependent, how- 
ever, as shown in Table II. Note that much higher discount rates are 
observed for households with very low incomes (89% for the poorest 
category). Translated into payback times, consumer behavior among the 
lowest income group in the U.S. seems to correspond to personal "payback 
times" of the order of 1 year (or even less). 
Any investment that pays for itself in much less than twenty years would 
be an unambiguous economic gain at the macro-economic level. (This 
follows from the fact that he average growth rate of the economy corre- 
sponds in a doubling time of the order of 20 years). Businesses are 
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Income Class # of Observations Implied Discount Rate 
$6.000 6 89.0% 
SlO,OOO 15 39.0% 
$15,000 16 27.0% 
$25,000 17 17.0% 
$35,000 8 8.9% 
$50,000 3 5.1% 
generally happy to invest in moderately risky projects that will pay for 
themselves in 5 years if they are successful. The existence of numerous 
opportunities for paybacks of one or two years, with almost no risk, is clear 
evidence of a non-equilibrium situation. 
Many economists have trouble with these implications. They ask: if, 
indeed, such opportunities really exist, why don't entrepreneurs operating 
in the competitive market-place find and exploit the opportunities? The 
fact that this doesn't seem to be happening suggests that the opportunities 
are not real, after all; according to this view, there must be "hidden costs". 
We have no authoritative answer to the question. (It is a topic that 
should be given greater attention by business chools, among others). We 
think, however, that the basic answer is related to two facts: (1) the oppor- 
tunities for energy conservation are mostly incremental; they require many 
small investments, rather than a few massive ones. This is difficult for 
industry because of the second fact (2) that large firms are central planners; 
they do not operate internally like competitive markets. They are bureau- 
cratic, hierarchical and "rule driven" rather than competitive. People with 
entrepreneurial instincts generally find it very difficult to function in 
bureaucracies or large firms. By the same token, large firms find it very 
difficult to induce their employees to behave ntrepreneurially. The reasons 
for this must be sought in the incentive systems that function in bureau- 
cracies. 
7. Secondary Economic Benefits of CO 2 Reduction 
As noted above (Figures 1 or 2), the economic benefit of emission reduc- 
tion is equated with the corresponding damage reduction. A simple ap- 
proximation to damage reduction in the present case can therefore be 
obtained by dividing total "greenhouse" damages by total carbon dioxide. It 
was suggested by Nordhaus that the most probable cost of such damages 
would be $3.30 per ton of CO 2 eliminated, with an upper limit of $37/ton 
(Nordhaus 89). We argued above that the first figure may be too low by a 
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factor of ten, not even allowing for unquantified items such as loss of 
recreational and ecological assets. For purposes of further analysis we take 
the direct "Greenhouse" benefits of eliminating CO2 to be at least $30 per 
ton, as discussed previously. 
However, except for the deforestation component, carbon dioxide is 
almost entirely produced by the burning of fossil fuels. This, in turn, 
generates emissions of air pollutants uch as SO,, NO,, CO, and so on. 
One cannot eliminate combustion-related CO2 without cutting down on the 
other pollutants, barring the unlikely case that all of the reduction is 
accomplished at the expense of the most benign of the fossil fuels, natural 
gas. In economic terms, greenhouse gases and conventional air pollutants 
are co-products. Hence the benefits of CO2 emission reduction must be 
equated to the full set of benefits of reduced fossil fuel (at least, coal and 
oil) combustion, whether it be achieved by regulation, conservation or 
taxation. The latter, in turn, include all of the health and environmental 
benefits of air pollution reduction. (It is important to observe that air 
pollution benefits due to reduced fuel consumption will be in addition to 
and independent ofany benefits achieved by emission controls). 
Of course, the air pollution and health costs of fossil fuel use depend on 
the specific fuel. They are much greater for coal, for instance, than for 
natural gas. One can monetarize these benefits by a procedure that was first 
used for evaluating the social costs of road traffic and energy consumption 
in West Germany (Grupp 86; Hohmeyer 88). The major air pollutants 
cause damages at very different concentration levels. Relative weighting 
factors can be chosen as follows: Particulates = 100; SO 2 -- 100; NO x = 
125; VOC =100; CO =1. 
Since these toxicity weightings are derived mainly from animal experi- 
ments, the extrapolation to impacts on vegetation and materials remains 
questionable. However we know that SO 2 and NOx contribute roughly 
equally to acidification, while CO, NO x and the hydrocarbon components 
take part in photochemical reactions (leading to ozone production) in a 
rather complicated and interrelated manner. Since most of the monetarized 
damages are linked to human health, these assumptions eem to be a 
defensible compromise. 
We also assume that the flow of annual damages from pollution (exclu- 
sive of the greenhouse ffect) is approximately proportional to current 
emissions. This means no accumulation effects are considered. Since the 
scope of our concern is global, no complex trans-border transport of 
pollutants need be considered. 
Table III shows emissions of traditional air pollutants in the FRG and 
the USA in the years 1975--1985, from all sources (including mobile 
sources (MS) and power plants (PP). These two categories account for 
most of the coal and petroleum, although some gas is used in electricity 
production and some oil is used for home heating. In effect, we are 
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FRG USA 
1975 1980 1985 a 1975 1980 1985 a 
Particulates 
all 813 696 576 a 
MS 61 64 70 a 
PP 179 151 127 d 
SO2 
all 3325 3187 2345 a 
MS 132 107 94" 
PP 2062 1976 1426 d 
NOx 
all 2532 2935 2924 a 
MS 1297 1594 1718 a 
PP 709 813 719 a 
HC 
all 2545 2486 2371 a 
MS 1164 1249 1196 ~ 
PP 25 16 24 d 
CO 
all 13014 11708 8804" 
MS 10148 8808 6301 a 
PP 521 471 352 a 
10600 8500 7000 a 
1300 1300 1400 a 
3036 2125 1750 b 
26000 23900 21600 a 
700 900 900 a 
16829 16102 14768 c
19100 20300 19800 a 
8900 9200 8800 a 
4929 6101 6463 c 
22800 2300 20300 a 
10200 8200 6700 a 
222 230 203 b 
81000 76100 64300 a 
62000 52600 45200 a 
3380 3044 2572 b 
a (OECD 89). 
b adjusted from (NAPAP 90). 
b adjusted from (Benkovitz 82). 
d adjusted from (Hohmeyer  88). 
neglecting the pollutant effects of natural gas consumption. Weighting the 
data with the (toxicity) factors given above yields the results in Figure 5. 
Table IV shows the result in relative shares for mobile sources and for the 
power plant sector in total air pollution for the FRG and USA, Table V 
gives total annual CO2 emission in these two sectors for each country. 
Table IV. Air  pollution fractions (% of total) from weighted 
emissions by sector 
1975 1980 1985 
F.R.G. Mobile Sources 30.9 34.5 39.5 
Power Plants 31.6 31.2 27.4 
U.S.A. Mobi le Sources 28.5 27.5 27.5 
Power Plants 31.3 32.0 33.4 
Sources: (OECD 89; NAPAP 90(II); Hohmeyer  88). 
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Fig. 5. F.R.G. & U.S.A.: weighted emissions 1975--1985. Source: authors (adapted from 
OECD 89 & others). 
The highest costs of external effects of air pollution are health-related. 8 
Respiratory diseases, for instance, lead to costs of medical treatment, 
increased morbidity (loss of working time plus direct costs of illness) and 
an increased risk of mortality. Many epidemiological studies have at- 
tempted to establish a relationship between ambient pollutant concentra- 
tion and incidence of acute and chronic diseases. Based on such studies 
(especially Lave & Seskin 71), Myrick Freeman estimated a pollution- 
mortality elasticity of 0.05, which means a 0.5% decrease in mortality for a 
10% pollution reduction (Freeman 79, 82). He concluded that a 20% air 
pollution reduction in the U.S. would save between 2780 and 27,800 lives 
per year. (Freeman's work is old, but has not been superseded). 
The next step is to impute the monetary valuation of morbidity and 
mortality benefits. While this is a highly controversial topic, it is unavoid- 
able. In many policy areas it is necessary to balance the value of saving 
human life (by investing in risk-reduction) against other benefits, implicitly 
if not explicitly. Freeman used a value of S1 million per statistical ife 
saved, based on individuals' apparent willingness to pay to reduce risk of 
mortality (Freeman 79). Others have used the loss of expected net future 
domestic income per capita to estimate the damages to society which range 
from $0.3 to $10 million per human life (e.g. Gaines et al. 79; Grupp 86; 
Wicke 86). 
Freeman's best point estimate for the annual human health benefits of a 
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Conversion Factor Electricity Transportation 












1.42 3.84 42.08 113.93 
4.22 9.03 
49.82 169.99 42.08 113.93 
357.37 1270.86 
25.12 68.01 445.75 1206.85 
72.66 155.49 
455.15 1494.36 445.75 1206.85 
Source: (OECD/IEA 88). 
20% reduction in air pollution for the U.S. was S17 billion in 1978 prices 
(Freeman 79). Assuming linearity, this implies total damages of $85 billion 
per year. A more recent study for the EPA suggests that the annual benefits 
might be greater than Freeman's figure, but it is difficult to derive an 
annuatized figure from the method used (Mathtech 83); see also (OECD 
84). 
For Germany, one study estimates the annual total costs of respiratory 
diseases (assuming 29% to 50% are due to air pollution) to range from DM 
2.3 to DM 5.8 billion (Wicke 86). Another estimate ranges from 6.8 to 
27.2 billion DM/yr (Orupp 86). Still another study yields damage stimates 
ranging from 1.6 to 40.3 billion DM/yr (Hohmeyer 88), based on figures 
given by (Euler 84). 
Air pollution also causes accelerated corrosion and weathering of 
materials. For instance surface corrosion rates of zinc are five times higher 
in polluted areas than in clean-air regions, causing slow but significant 
damages to steel construction (Isecke 86). The need to enhance surface 
protection (of cables, for instance) increases co ts in ways that are difficult 
to specify precisely. Further sources of damages include corrosion of 
natural stone used in buildings and outdoor works of art such as sculptures 
(The Statue of Liberty and Cologne Cathedral, for example). 
Freeman estimated that benefits of a 20% reduction of air pollution for 
the U.S. to be about S0.9 billion in the field of materials; this implies total 
damages (assuming linearity) of $4.5 billion. In earlier times, when coal- 
burning was more widespread Parrish found the total annual damages to be 
some $6 billion a year (Parrish 63). 
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For Germany annual damages from corrosion have been estimated by 
various people. One study set the figure at about 2.3 billion DM (Wicke 
86), based on updated studies by (Heinz 86). Grupp estimated annual costs 
of 3.2-4.2 billion DM (not including damages to cultural property and 
monuments, in contrast o additional window cleaning). Hohmeyer (1988) 
estimated the flow of damages from corrosion to be in the range of 2.3 to 
4.2 billion DM/yr. 
Air polllution also causes vegetation damages by acidic deposition of 
photochemical oxidants ("acid rain"). Freeman estimated benefits of a 20% 
air pollution reduction in terms of reduced damage to vegetation in the 
range of S0.2-$2.4 billion/yr (Freeman 79). Total damages would, of 
course, be 5 X greater. Crocker arrived at more narrowly bounded figures 
of $3.1 billion/yr, including forest losses $1.75 billion, agricultural losses of 
S1 billion and aquatic ecosystem damages of S0.3 billion (Crocker 79). 
In the FRG, the most visible and severe damages to vegetation are found 
in the forests. One study evaluated the forest decline as an annual oss of 
value of 5.5 to 8.8 billion DM (Ewers et al. 86). Hohmeyer estimated 
additional damages to agricultural crops of 1 billion DM/yr (Hohmeyer 
88). No damages to wild flora and fauna were taken into account. 
Table VI and VII summarize the numbers chosen by Freeman and 
Hohmeyer (Freeman 79; Hohmeyer 88). Note that both authors assume 
large confidence intervals which should be interpreted as the possible range 
of values of minimum cost figures. The figures are underestimates, to the 
extent hat some important components are still omitted, for example loss 
of quality of life. Using Tables VI and VII we can relate damages to specific 
types of fuel consumption. Freeman's damage figures are based on benefits 
of pollution control by 20% reduction, more than ten years ago. However, 
as shown in Figure 5 the level and composition f emissions in the U.S. 
hasn't changed ramatically since the 70's. 
For the purposes of this study, the decline in emission is assumed to be 
Table VI. Benefits of an air pollution reduction of 20% (billion 1978 USS/yr) 
Damages to US Range Best Point Percent 
Health 3.1--39.3 16.8 80% 
Soil 0.5--5.0 2.0 9% 
Vegetation 0.2--2.4 0.7 3% 
Materials 0.5--1.4 0.9 4% 
Other 0.1 --8.9 1.0 4% 
Total 4.4--57.0 21.4 100% 
($21.4: --80%, +166%) 
Source: (Freeman 79). 
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Table VII. Estimated damages from air pollution by type of damage (billion 
DM/year) 
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Damages toFRG Range Center Percent 
Health 1.6--40.3 21.0 65% 
Materials 2.3--4.2 3.2 10% 
Vegetation 6.5--9.5 8.2 25% 
Total 10.4--54.0 32.2 100% 
Source: (Hohmeyer 88). 
compensated roughly by the increase in prices. For the U.S. transport 
sector, we impute benefits of 0.275"S107 = $29.4 billion/yr associated 
with 1315 Mt-CO2/yr emissions, which yields a net benefit of $22 per ton 
of CO2 eliminated by consuming less petroleum based fuels. Similarly, for 
the electricity sector, we obtain 0.334"S107 --$35.7 billion/yr. Dividing 
by related emissions of 1532.54 Mt-CO2 implies a benefit of $23 per ton of 
CO2 eliminated, mainly by consuming less coal. 
Based on similar calculations for the FRG, air pollution damage from 
mobile sources amounts to 103 DM (roughly $57 at current exchange 
rates) per ton of CO2 eliminated. For electricity generation, we obtain 51 
DM ($28) per ton of CO 2 eliminated. The fact that the German figures are 
higher than the U.S. figures is understandable, in view of the fact that 
damages are a function of exposure, and Germany is a more densely 
populated country. It should be emphasized, again, that these figures are 
not precise. In fact, the range of uncertainty on the upper side is of the 
same order as the number, while on the down side it is of the order of half 
the number. 
8. Conclusions for Policy 
It is not our purpose to try to establish an optimal policy instrument to 
induce energy conservation, or even an optimal tax policy (given the 
economists usual prejudice in favor of taxes over regulation). In this 
context, it seems to us that optimality is an inappropriate goal. Not only is 
it essentially impossible to achieve, but the time and effort expended on the 
debate is a distraction from the real issue. Current policies were not 
optimized from an economic perspective, nor is the political system 
conducive to optimization. But it is not difficult to assemble persuasive 
arguments that almost any tax on extractive resources -- especially those 
whose intensive use results in large, unpaid social and environmental costs 
-- is preferable to the present system of taxing labor (either directly or in 
the guise of value-added), assets (capital) and consumption. 
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Taxation is unquestionably an effective method of modifying social 
behavior, from consumption to investment, as economists have long recog- 
nized. 9 A general principle of tax policy should be to reduce or eliminate 
taxes on desirable behavior (such as personal savings or capital investment) 
and to increase taxes on undesirable consumption items such as cigarettes 
and alcoholic beverages. With respect to the consumption of energy 
(mostly from fossil fuels) and other environment-destroying toxic substances, 
however, tax policy in the U.S. is contradictory. Most countries set very 
high taxes on all forms of energy use, especially automotive gasoline. 
(Despite high taxes, the energy and automotive industries of Europe and 
Japan remain healthy). The U.S. does not tax energy or toxic materials use, 
despite an obvious need for more government revenue, out of political 
concern for the jobs that might be lost. 
With respect o revenues, the assumption made by many conservatives is 
that revenues iphoned out of the private sector by any tax will be used 
totally unproductively by the government. Liberals, on the other hand, 
seem to assume just the opposite. In the present context, the liberal 
assumption would be that revenues from a carbon tax (or a sulfur tax) 
would be automatically used to compensate for the environmental damages 
caused by the buildup of CO2 or SO x. The truth is certainly not so simple, 
either way. But, disregarding the use of the tax revenues, It wouM still be 
socially beneficial to impose such a tax as long as its tiet cost to energy users 
(i.e. society) is less than the social benefits --  reduced environmental damages -- 
of lower fossil fuel combustion. 
For each tonne of CO2 eliminated, we estimate these benefits as follows: 
$30 for natural gas (based on greenhouse ffects of CO2 alone, ignoring 
likely methane leakage which would probably justify a much higher tax), 
S52/ton for petroleum and S53/ton for coal in the U.S. Two fifths of the 
benefits in the case of petroleum and coal are attributable to associated 
reductions in other pollutants, notably NOx, SOx, particulates and un- 
burned hydrocarbons. For the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) the 
petroleum and coal figures are, respectively, $87 and $58} ~ In the case of 
the FRG, health-related benefits of reduced NO~ and SO x outweigh climate 
benefits. 
To obtain this assumed benefit, consumption must be reduced by raising 
the effective price to consumers. The reduction in consumption resulting 
from a rise in price (or tax) depends on the price elasticity of demand. 
(The less elastic the demand, the greater the reduction in consumption per 
increment of added price). Nobody knows exactly what the price elasticity 
of demand for petroleum or coal is, but a number that "seems more or less 
right" to most economists i --0.3. That is, a fuel price increase of 1% would 
result in a drop of 0.3% in demand for that form of fuel. Roughly, a 100% 
increase in the price of fuel would result in a 30% cut in use. 
Coal costs about S50/ton. It is about 80% carbon. To get a reduction of 
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1 ton of CO 2 (worth more than $30 in terms of climatic benefits and more 
than $20 in terms of air quality benefits) consumption of 0.273 tons of 
coal-carbon must be eliminated. This corresponds to 0.34 tons of coal not 
burned. Assuming a price elasticity of -0.3, this is the reduction that would 
be achievable by increasing the price to consumers by 100%. In short, any 
tax that doubles the price of coal (i.e. S50/tonne) would save over $50 in 
environmental costs to the society as a whole, while also producing about 
S33 in net revenues for the government - - to use productively, or not. In 
the U.S., based on a pre-tax consumption of 500 million tonnes per annum, 
such a tax would cut consumption by 170 million tonnes and generate 
$16.5 billion in revenues. 
Of course, there would also be both short term adjustment costs (e.g. 
shifts to natural gas or untaxed fuels) and long term "drag" costs on the 
economy. The effect of the higher coal price would be passed through, for 
instance, to the steel industry and to the consumers of steel products; 
similarly it would affect the cost of electricity and all users of electricity. 
The end result would be a structural shift further away from energy- 
intensive industries and towards energy-conservation services and non- 
fossil sources of energy (such as solar electricity). 
Yohe and his colleagues investigated the potential drag effects of a 100% 
carbon tax (phased in over the 20 years from 2000--2020) or an equivalent 
consumption restriction (Yohe et al. 89). Their assumptions are based on 
work suggesting that the sudden increases in petroleum prices that oc- 
curred in 1973 and 1979 caused drops in productivity growth (Olson 88). 
It is assumed that any tax on fossil fuels would have the same depressing 
effect. Assuming productivity drops ranging from 0.05% p.a. to 0.7% p.a. 
for a carbon tax amounting to 100% of current prices, cumulative lost 
productivity of $75 to $550 billion would be experienced up to the year 
2010. 
This approach is not very convincing, for two reasons. First, the essence 
of the "oil shock" was that money was taken from western producers and 
consumers and deposited in bank accounts belonging to (predominantly) 
OPEC members. They, in turn, increased their spending for consumer 
goods, military goods and long-term infra-structure projects, none of which 
contributed to increased productivity in the west. On the other hand, the 
impact of a tax collected within the western economies would, of course, 
depend on how the money was spent. However, if the new tax were offset 
dollar-for dollar by a reduction in other taxes, there is no reason to expect 
an automatic depressing effect on the economy. Second, we note that the 
observed productivity drop since 1973--74 has many other possible expla- 
nations, of which the most widely accepted seems to be that it reflects the 
inevitable "catchup" of the U.S. by Europe and Japan. 11 
In summary, we think a carbon tax (proportional to carbon content of 
different fuel types) and/or a sulfur tax (proportional to the sulfur content 
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of the airbone or water-borne emissions) would be consistent with the so- 
called "polluter-pays" principle and would avoid some of the administra- 
tive burden associated with regulation. In order to avoid severe market 
disturbances, uch a tax should be slowly phased in (over one or two 
decades), in the context of international cooperation. We strongly suggest 
that the (rather high) tax revenues could (and should) be used to reduce other 
forms of taxes. As we have noted, such taxes now fall mainly on labor, 
capital and trade, which are economic activities that should be encouraged 
- -  insofar as they do not involve the use of fossil fuels or toxic materials -- 
rather than discouraged. 
It is interesting to compare our final results with those of Nordhaus 
(Nordhaus 89), in terms of marginal shadow costs of abatement. The 
Nordhaus analysis assumed that the cost of abatement rises monotonically 
with the degree of abatement, i.e. percentage of CO2-equivalent reduction. 
The major policy conclusions of his analysis were as follows: 
-- CFC phase-out is the lowest cost option. Total elimination would cut
the CO2-equivalent emissions by 14%. A high gasoline tax would be 
the next most effective policy option. 
- -  Reforestation is not a cost-effective option (at marginal costs as- 
sumed to be S100/ton of CO2 removed). 
-- The shadow costs of CO2 reduction by a global carbon tax would 
exceed the benefits except at low levels of abatement. It is not an 
efficient policy. 
For the case of high costs associated with greenhouse warming (S37/ton 
of carbon dioxide or equivalent RIG) the optimal policy would yield a 28% 
reduction in CO2-equivalent emissions and 94% reduction of CFC use. 
We have arrived at significantly different conclusions, partly because we 
disagree with the underlying cost assumptions, and partly because we have 
tried to take into account ancillary benefits of policies that would reduce 
other pollution-related damages. 
In our view, as stated above, the most cost-effective policy is likely to be 
energy conservation combined with' substitution of natural gas for other 
fuels to the extent dictated by direct cost savings. This would reduce energy 
consumption by 20% or so and carbon dioxide emissions by about 25% 
compared to present levels, though the overall impact on RIG emissions 
would be more like 12%. The most effective policy to bring about this 
degree of conservation would be a carbon tax on all fossil fuels sup- 
plemented by a sulfur emissions tax on sulfur-containing fuels. 
The virtual elimination of CFC's, as suggested by Nordhaus, would 
probably be the next most cost-effective policy, with a further 14% reduc- 
tion in RIG's. Further abatement beyond that would be achievable by some 
combination of further energy conservation, fuel substitution, and introduc- 
tion of non-polluting solar (or other) energy sources, combined with exten- 
The Greenhouse Effect 265 
sive reforestation. We are unable to evaluate the relative costs and benefits 
of these policies in more detail at this time, however. 
Appendix A: Forests 
A popular proposal is to sequester excess atmospheric arbon-dioxide by 
means of photosynthesis, using large plantations of fast-growing trees as a 
sink. To halt the present annual atmospheric increase of carbon (2.9 Gt of 
C per year) by massive afforestation, the required land area in temperate 
climate regions would be about 465 million hectares (Mha) (Sedjo & 
Solomon 90). This is equal to 1.5 times the present forest area of the U.S. 
or 15% of the global forest area. The land requirement is large but not 
totally out of the question. For instance, it is biologically feasible to double 
the biomass density (Sedjo & Solomon 90; Ranney et al. 87; Myers & 
Goreau 90) 
Planting costs are estimated to be S230--$1000/ha ( veraging S400/ha). 
In the U.S. suitable land costs roughly $400--$1000/ha, lthough in some 
regions it would be lower. Land costs represent real opportunity costs, 
since land used as carbon sink cannot be used for crops of pasture. The 
prospects of finding a large area of suitable land in the western countries 
appears slim. However, it is estimated that there is at least 500 Mha of 
degraded or deforested tropical land (Houghton & Woodwell 89). De- 
graded land costs much less; in Indonesia total costs of S400 per hectare 
are indicated (Sedjo & Solomon 90); in India, costs are even lower (Myers 
89). 
Total costs of $372 billion for new plantations in temperate zones and 
$186 billion in the tropics, would result in marginal costs of reducing CO2 
of S35/ton and S17/ton respectively (Sedjo & Solomon 90). These figures 
are in sharp contrast o the pessimistic S100/ton estimated by Nordhaus 
(1989). 
Appendix B: Reducing CFC's 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) are chemically inert compounds, used as 
solvents, propellants and refrigerants. They are not readily degraded by 
chemical reactions in the lower atmosphere. As a consequence, CFC's 
gradually diffuse into the stratosphere where they are effective absorbers of 
long-wave (IR) thermal radiation. Because CFC's are about 20,000 times 
more efficient than CO 2 as IR absorbers, the two most common CFC's, 
CFC-11 and CFC-12, alone contribute about 14% of all RIG emissions. 
The replacement of CFC's is relatively cost efficient because of the small 
quantities involved. The propellant and solvent uses are fairly easy to find 
substitutes for. The most difficult use to dispense with is refrigeration and 
air-conditioning. However, there are a variety of technically feasible sub- 
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stitutes for CFC 's  with shorter  atmospher ic  l i fetimes and/or  less absorpt ion  
strength in the crit ical f requency band. Desp i te  some disadvantages, such as 
greater f lammabi l i ty  and reduced efficiency as refrigerants, it is reasonable 
to assume subst itut ion costs of  the order  of S5/kg,  or  about  S0 .25/ ton  of 
CO 2 equivalent e l iminated (Pool  88). 
P rob lems will arise in deve lop ing countries. China, for instance, is p lan-  
ning to raise refr igerator product ion  by the year  2000, and to boost  CFC 
product ion  to levels tenfold higher than those in the USA today; Ch ina did 
not  sign the Montrea l  Protoco l  (Mi l ler  89). 
A non-tr iv ial  inc idental  benef it  of CFC reduct ion would be a s lower rate 
of dep let ion  of the stratospher ic  ozone layer. We have no quantitat ive 
est imate of monetary  worth of  this, however.  
Notes 
1 For details see: (Schneider 89, 89a, 89b; Schneider & Rosenberg 90; Bolin et al. 86; 
USEPA 88; Mintzer 87). 
2 Gross National Income (GNI) differs from GNP by excluding indirect business taxes and 
capital set aside to replace depreciation. 
3 See, for instance, the Brundtland Report (Brundtland 87, pp. 291--294, 300); also 
(Renner 89, pp. 141--144); (Myers 89). 
4 The classic example of the "lock-in" phenomenon is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard, 
which is known to be inefficient but which is so well established that it seems unchangeable 
(David 85). Another example might be the persistent use of the so-called "English system of 
weights and measures." For a theoretical discussion of positive returns to scale and self- 
reinforcing mechanisms in economics see (Arthur 83, 88; Arthur et al. 87a). 
5 For an early review paper see (Manne, Richels & Weyant 79). Also (Manne 81; Edmonds 
& Reilly 85, 85a; Manne & Richels 90). 
6 Many projects are evaluated in terms of payback time rather than return. The two 
concepts are closely related. A project with a payback time of 1 year corresponds to 100% 
return on investment. A project that pays for itself in 6 months has an annual return of 
200%, and so on. 
7 It should be noted that the Mellon study was thoroughly criticized by a group at MIT, at 
the request of the Department of Energy (Berndt et al. 8a). The critique was extensive and 
detailed, and a number of significant substantive and methodological criticisms were offered. 
One criticism was directed at the study's implication that a "least cost" solution would be 
achieved automatically if the economy were truly competitive. The authors of the critique 
asserted that competition does not necessarily yield an optimal result and that regulation 
might be more effective. The critique also noted that some of the projected savings were 
"imposed" on the study, rather than being derived endogenously. The examples cited in this 
regard included projected savings by the use of variable-speed lectric motors, co-genera- 
tion of electric power and industrial process heat, and dieselization fthe bus fleet. 
In retrospect, the b nefits of variable speed motors were probably exaggerated some- 
what. However, in defense of the study, it should be noted that there is no way technological 
shifts such as the .ones noted could be generated endogenously by any economic model. 
Moreover, a large number of other specific but minor opportunities for saving energy via the 
use of available technology were necessarily overlooked, simply because the authors had 
limited time and resources available to them. Thus, it is more likely that he extent of the 
conservation pportunities were underestimated than conversely. 
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8 Losses of quality of life are still not monetarized, hence not included in any of the 
estimates below. 
9 The major argument of the "supply-siders" in the early Reagan years was that excessive 
taxes on income would discourage productive ffort, whence tax-cuts would actually gen- 
erate new entrepreneurial ctivity. The long-standing argument for eliminating capital gains 
taxes is based on similar notions. Virtually all economists would agree that income or capital 
gains tax cuts are stimulative. The major argument is whether the revenue gains for the 
government would exceed the losses, which is a very different issue. 
10 To convert hese benefit numbers to S per ton of actual fuel, remember that each ton of 
carbon dioxide emitted corresponds to 0.273 tons of carbon in the fuel. so the benefit is in 
proportion. 
~1 In fact, an OECD Seminar on the "Apparent Productivity Paradox" held in June 1989 
and attended by a number of the world's top economists, considered in detail a number of 
the extant heories of the decline in productivity growth since 1972--73. The rise in energy 
prices as a causal factor was not even discussed. This does not mean that energy prices 
played no role, but it appears that most economists who attended no longer believe that role 
to have been crucial. 
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